Abstract: A modern conception of oligarchy, which can be housed under an authoritarian regime as easily as it can under a liberal democratic one, can affect our understanding of the potential national political repercussions of extreme inequalities of wealth. This article has two goals:
Introduction
This article 1 argues that Winters' concept of oligarchy can be extended to politics at the national level in Thailand. The coup d'état on 22 May 2014 by military forces led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha, Commander of the Thai Royal Army, may offer evidence against the argument that Thailand has an oligarchy. A year earlier, the representative democracy in Thailand -despite it being "low" on liberalism (Rhoden 2013 ) -may have also opposed such a classification. Thailand with its unique form of constitutional monarchy, sometimes termed a "network monarchy" (McCargo 2005 ), also appears to argue against oligarchy. Additionally, a review of Riggs' (1966) now-classic concept of "bureaucratic polity" or Chai-anan's (1991) concept of "three-dimensional Thai state" 2 also seems to challenge any notion of national-level oligarchy.
The present paper argues that while Thailand is not an oligarchy, it does very much have an oligarchy. This is not a play on words. To understand why the above claim is empirically true, one must revisit the concept of oligarchy and allow for misconceptions to change. Three specific elements need to change. Firstly, the theory of oligarchy, as originally understood by Aristotle, is not a regime, but a very powerful, hard-toeradicate, and not always coherent element of almost every state and society since Aristotle posited his mixed regime, including contemporary Thailand. Secondly, the theory of oligarchy is a materialist theory of power. Thirdly, the theory of oligarchy can be applied to Thailand and, by doing so, researchers of social science gain a new perspective of recent turmoil in Thai national politics.
Every theory, method or approach provides insight. For some students of Thai politics and society, recognising that Thailand has an oligarchy may induce something of a modest epiphany. For others, this recognition will be more like an intellectual homecoming. There are many ways to describe Thailand's national politics, including the concept of oligarchy, regardless if one likes or dislikes the word. This article is about theory and classification and how it applies to one national state in 1 The author would like to thank Danny Unger, Michael Buehler, and Patrick Jory, as well as commentators at the 12th International Conference on Thai Studies at the University of Sydney and the Southeast Asian Studies Student Conference at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at NIU, for reading earlier drafts of the manuscript. 2
Translations from Thai or German into English are the author's. Trai laksana rath thai (Å¦¨¬¦Å¥): this regime concept is very much at odds with outsider, non-Thai classifications.
Southeast Asia. I agree that a causal argument may be more powerful than a descriptive argument in the social sciences. However, because there is still so much confusion over the term oligarchy and its applicability outside of Hellenistic Greece, I make a simpler argument of reviewed classification and exampled application. Oligarchy as diction can be more than a facile epithet. Oligarchy is, in fact, a vital force in Thailand's political society.
Oligarchs versus Elites
People who have the power to effect change that average citizens or subjects cannot are called elites. However, the word elite is often overused. In discussions about a particular divergence from an elite, like an "oligarch", people often miss the analytical value in that difference. When we discuss the elites at the top of a state or society, we should be ready to question where the power base of those elites lies. Just as not all power resources are the same, not all elites are the same either. This is a simple observation to make, but a crucial one. Much of the blame for eliding the difference between an elite and an oligarch must lie with scholars such as Robert Michels (1911) and his oft-cited "iron law of oligarchy". There are at least six sources of power for elites: (1) formal political right, (2) official position, (3) coercion, (4) mobilisation, (5) ideology, and -most importantly for the present study -(6) material resource (Winters 2011: 11-20) . Power regarding political rights (in democracies at least) is the most diluted power resource, since universal suffrage is, by definition, an equalization of this power resource. Power from official positions is normally what we think of when we imagine elites: heads of governmental institutions, corporations, and other secular or religious organisations. As a power resource, when one is in office, the "power to" can be high. Once out of office, however, access to that power disappears immediately. Coercive power -the ability to harness violence or threaten to do so -is as old as time and, in modern national states, becomes the legal prerogative of the state over a given territory. Mobilisation power is an individual's ability to sway or inspire others to realise their latent political powers in larger groups. Occasionally, mobilisation can trump other powers in exigencies (for example, Mao Zedong, Gandhi, Ho Chi Minh), but because of the problem of sustained collective action, as argued by Olson (1965) , this can be fleeting during "the politics of the ordinary" (Winters 2011: 19) . Ideological power may seem the most transient because it is best articulated when added to these other power resources.
This leaves the remaining question of power based on material resources, which is at the heart of modern oligarchic theory.
Material power is power based on wealth. 3 An elite is any individual who sits at the top of state and society due to one of the initial five resources of power above, whilst an oligarch is any individual whose primary source of power comes from a material wealth that is magnitudes greater than that of the majority. 4 Since Michels' theory of organisations within democracies is about power based on group and party dynamics, it would have made more sense if he had called his "law" the iron law of elites. When one speak of oligarchs contra elites, the discussion is not about one's political rights, official position, personal coercive ability, skill at mobilisation, or ideology, but instead about how a great inequality of wealth is utilised as political power.
Oligarchy's Non-Marxist Lineage
Not all materialist traditions lead back to classical Marxism. Whilst both Marxism and modern oligarchy focus on material resources, Marxist analysis tends to focus on how wealth is built up as opposed to how it is defended. For oligarchic theory, these particular upstream concerns on the modes of production or surplus extraction are superfluous for downstream analyses on how a wealthy individual defends one's property and income. What is of interest here is not how material resources are used economically to create socio-political effects, but how material resources are used politically to create economic effects that benefit an oligarch in their wealth defence of either property or income or both (Winters 2011: 9) .
Modern oligarchic theory is not a rehashing of classical Marxism. Unlike any notion of herrschenden Klassen -of directly ruling classes (Marx 1867 : 261) -modern oligarchic theory states explicitly that oligarchs do 3 Wealth does not have to mean how much money one has in the bank, but instead depends on historical circumstances. The extreme wealth of a feudal lord is not counted in the same way as Bill Gates' estimated USD 76 billion (Dolan and Kroll 2014) . However, both individuals are able to effect political change, if they wish, on a scale and kind that is unavailable to the majority because of that wealth, as is exampled by the Koch Brothers in America (Sargent 2014 ). 4 Winters (2011: 9) noted that it is not unusual for oligarchs to "have elite forms of power stacked on top of or blended with their defining material foundation. This would make them simultaneously oligarchs and elites. But no elite can be an oligarch in the absence of holding and personally deploying massive material power."
not have to rule in order to defend their wealth. An oligarchy is not a class like the bourgeoisie. The utility of modern oligarchic theory is that it allows researchers to analyse the socio-political world from a materialist perspective without falling into the tired structural constraints of Marx and Engels. Oligarchy stresses agency over structure. This is not to argue against classical Marxism per se, which is impossible in a short article, but to acknowledge that the oligarchic tradition of material power has a deeper lineage in political theory. 5 Part of the reason why Piketty's (2014) recent near-700-page tome reached number one on the New York Times bestseller's list for nonfiction is because both scholars and the lay public alike are hungry for a way to understand the influence that extreme wealth and money has on national politics in materialist terms beyond those of Marxism. Modern oligarchic theory is one such approach that may also be useful in these types of analyses. For the sake of analytical clarity and brevity, the differences between oligarchy and Marxism are summarised in Table 1 below. Winters has done well to reorient the concept of oligarchy away from Marxism toward the original Aristotelian concept. Despite the etymology of oligarkhía, where olígos (the few) and arkho (to rule) seem to suggest a regime type, Aristotle's use of oligarchy is more complicated. Though it would be a reductionist interpretation of Aristotle's use of the word oligarchy to mean only "the rich", it would be even more incorrect to think that an oligarch can be an oligarch without access to power based on material wealth. Aristotle (1985: 96-97 ; 350s BCE) challenged those of his own time who wished to conflate any small klatch in power with oligarchy within that regime:
If a well-off majority has authority, and similarly in the other case, if it somewhere happened that the poor were a minority with respect to the well off but were superior and had authority in the regime, although when a small number has authority it is called oligarchy, this definition of the regimes would not be held to be a fine one.
The reason this definition of oligarchy "would not be held to be a fine one" for Aristotle is because it elides the very real differences in power resources that persist between an oligarch and an elite. A small group can rule a nation, as in the current military regime in Thailand, but to call them an oligarchy would be a misuse of the term since their power resides in coercion and not in their wealth. 6 As will be shown below in the case of Thailand, oligarchy can persist in spite of the regime type, surviving not just governmental change but regime change. Thus, even within liberal democracy, which strives for political equality but not material equality, an oligarchy can persist. Whether they actually rule or not may tell us about the type or form of oligarchy housed within that particular regime, but it will not stop one from claiming that there is an oligarchy present and that those oligarchs use their wealth politically to effect legislation that further protects their property and income. Oligarchy is not a regime type. In short, oligarchy "refers to the politics of wealth defense by materially endowed actors" (Winters 2011: 7) .
Measuring Oligarchy in Thailand
How can we measure oligarchy? Consider an oligarch by the name of former-PM Thaksin Shinawatra who wishes to stage a public protest that lasts for months in a plush, urban shopping district in city of over ten million people. Then ask how much more powerful this Thaksin is than the average Thai citizen. There are things to count everywhere. One can count how much it costs to feed x number of protesters for x number of days, as well as transportation costs, costs for stage equipment and speakers, costs for blankets and tents, costs to pay off some portion of police and/or military to allow the protest to last longer, costs for media at the event, for the nation, and for international consumption, costs to buy off other politicians to stay the course, costs to provide cash assistance to families who lose loved ones in the protests, costs to pay off protesters when they return home to vote again, costs to forward legislation to convict politicians who went against the oligarch and grant amnesty to all those involved, costs to afford a palatial lifestyle in a foreign country whilst the oligarch waits until the dust has settled around the protests and returns home, and so on. A specific number can be attached and then compared to determine exactly how much more powerful an oligarch is than an average citizen. A key point when measuring oligar-chies is that oligarchs do not have infinite powers. Unlike other power resources, the measurement for oligarchic power in a contemporary state and society will always be finite, which means that material power is limited only by the amount of wealth at hand. In this sense,
Material power is unique in that it allows oligarchs to purchase sustained engagement of others who require no personal commitment to the goals of the oligarchs they serve (Winters 2011: 18) .
That said, not all measurements of oligarchic power are the same and some ways of counting will effect an unnecessary distortion of reality. One option is to consider wealth in "quintile groups"; in this case, the entire population of Thailand divided into five groups from poorest to richest. As a person moves from Group 1 (the lowest income) to Group 5 (the highest income), the share of the total national income increases at every tier: Group 1 has less than 1 per cent of the wealth in Thailand; Group 2 has 3 per cent; Group 3 has 9 per cent; Group 4 has 18 per cent; and Group 5 has 69 per cent, as represented in Figure 1 below (Kiatipong, Sinswat, and Chutchotitham 2008: 14) . However, the challenge for an oligarchic analysis that attempts to uncover whether or not Thailand has a oligarchic component in its current military regime, is that when one talks about the top 20 per cent, this is much too large a segment of the population to be either considered "a few" or to have the access to the requisite individual material power necessary for the urban street protests described above. Not every member of the top 20 per cent can afford to bill political street carnival that led up to the coup in May 2014. Despite what Figure 1 shows regarding wealth distribution in Thai society, oligarchic analysis is better served by highlighting the top 1 per cent of society rather than the top 20. One might think that this information is difficult to obtain and question why a wealthy oligarch would voluntarily provide data on how much more materially powerful he or she is than the average citizen. In 2010, Satit Rungkasiri, director-general of the Fiscal Policy Office, estimated that only 2.3 million out of 9 million filed income tax returns actually paid anything, out of a total population of approximately 64 million Thais (Bangkok Post 2010). In a country where only 14 per cent of the population file income tax, is data available for analysis? Thankfully, the vanity of the rich is an aide for the researcher. Since 2006, the online edition of Forbes magazine has published a regular segment entitled "Thailand's Top 40" (now "Top 50") of the wealthiest individuals in the country. If one has an estimate of the net worth of the average Thai adult in any given year, then a Material Power Index (MPI) can be constructed to indicate exactly how many more times materially powerful an ultra-wealthy Thai oligarch is than the average Thai subject. And unlike power sources of ideology, official position, coerciveness, mobilization, or suffrage, an MPI is unnervingly exact as a measurement of the "power to" use, or not use, this material wealth. A comparative perspective is helpful when understanding the MPI strength of Thai oligarchs as it shows whether Thai society is an average contemporary case or an outlier in some particular way. Table 2 below ranks all countries in East and Southeast Asia (for which there is data) to show in MPI terms, which is the most oligarchic state in this part of the world. Table 2 shows that, as the net worth of the average adult in any one of these states increases, the more the relational material power of those few oligarchs decreases. In other words, the more egalitarian a society is in material terms, the weaker the power of an oligarch. This illustrates that even if most oligarchs in Southeast Asia deposit their wealth in Singaporean banks, their material power in relation to the normal Singaporean citizen drops by a factor of ten to a hundred as soon as they leave their own countries. This oligarchic analysis across nations also shows that the number-one oligarch in all of East and Southeast Asia (that is the wealthiest person, both nominally and relationally in comparison to average citizen's wealth) does not live in China, Japan, Hong Kong, or Singapore, or even Brunei, but in Thailand (the Thai monarch). Thailand is the most oligarchic state in Asia. 7 The analysis now moves toward identification of the Thai oligarchs.
Who Are the Thai Oligarchs?
Any oligarchic analysis should avoid coming up with a magic number of material net worth for a particular national state, whereby those below 7 As will be argued below, the Thai monarch is actually an oligarch, albeit of a special nature. However, even if one removes the monarch from Table 2 , Thailand's MPI only drops to 346,060. This is still higher than China's MPI of 320,699. Hence, with or without the monarch, Thailand contains the most oligarchic society by this estimate. Unlike Winters (2013) , I argue that the MPI of a theoretical 1 is better anchored to some estimate of average wealth per capita than to the estimate of GDP per capita, since GDP per capita is essentially income and not an individual's full net worth (assets minus debts).
the number are the less powerful normal citizens and those above it are the oligarchy (Winters and Page 2009: 737) . Not only are things like individuals' wealth-to-debt ratios and yearly income constantly in flux (and inflation's caustic effect), but researchers will never truly know the exact magnitude of an oligarch's material wealth. Even with the assistance of a Forbes "Top 50" list, oligarchs spend considerable resources in the "wealth defence industry", specifically in an effort to elude any national tax regime, not to mention lone researchers conducting such an analysis. Publicly-listed share holdings of major corporate enterprises used by journalists at Forbes never account for the entirety of these oligarchs' material wealth. Any oligarchic analysis on Thailand will always be an understatement of material power. For example, a computer hard drive packed with more than 260 gigabytes of unsorted memos, emails, spreadsheets, scanned passports, official documents, and corporate and personal accounting ledges was uncovered by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists in 2013 (Campbell 2013; Perlah 2013; Prangtip et al. 2013) . Among the files retrieved were personal accounts of Thai government officials and various high-society families. These individuals and families used exotic-sounding tax shelter companies like "Tropic Offshore Holdings, Inc.", many of which were registered in Singapore or other notorious tax havens.
Therefore, the cut-off point for the Thai oligarchy should be thought of as both always moving and as more of a gradation than any particular line. Despite the above caveats, one can say with certainty that Thailand's oligarchy does not incorporate everyone in the top half of society, the top quintile, or even the top 1 per cent. Only when one moves into the top 1/10th of 1 per cent, and especially the 1/100th of 1 per cent, is it possible to explicitly point to an oligarch that has a "power to" use extreme material wealth in a way that the average Thai citizen can only dream of. By this definition, every individual on the Forbes list for Thailand, regardless of how that material wealth was accumulated or that individual's other resources of power, easily falls into the category of an oligarch. In an effort to remain objective, I have removed the names of the oligarchs in Table 3 below, listing only the estimated net worth of the top five oligarchs against the average Thai individual's wealth along with a corresponding MPI. 8 8
Since Thaksin Shinawatra has already been mentioned earlier in this paper as an oligarch, I can also note the surprising fact that this former PM would not even make a top ten list in Thailand if one were able to disentangle his individual wealth from the wealth of "the family". See Karmali (2014) for actual names on
With the inclusion of the Thai monarch on Table 3 , Thailand presents an additional challenge to the question of who the oligarchs are. This challenge stems from the unique situation where the wealthiest oligarch in Thailand also happens to be a monarch. For much of agrarian human history, this situation may have been more the norm than the outlier -why wouldn't the person with the most material power also be the king? It is only in our zeitgeist and, admittedly, from the perspective of an advanced industrial liberal democratic society, that we can look with some surprise at the fact that a contemporary monarch is allowed to retain access to not just official positional and ideological sources of power but also vast extensions of power based on material wealth -in fact, more wealth than any coup-conspiring general, corrupt member of parliament, or Sino-blooded tycoon. Objectively, one must confront two challenges. First, as warned by other scholars if the term "oligarch" is a pejorative one, such an oligarchic analysis into the monarch's finances may be guilty of lèse-majesté (Porphant 2008: 167) . Second, if one is a constitutionally established monarch, does that somehow exclude the individual from being an oligarch even if he or she has access to the greatest base of material power in the nation, or in reality, in all of Asia? The first matter will be left for the reader to decide. The answer to the second is a resounding "no". The Thai monarch, for better or worse, also happens to be an oligarch and we must understand why this is empirically true before theorising as to the effects of Thai oligarchy on Thai Grossman and Faulder 2011) . The most recent report by Forbes on global royal wealth estimated the Thai monarch's nest egg at approximately USD 30 billion (Montlake 2012b) . In response to Forbes's reporting, the Thai Ambassador to Washington, DC wrote a public letter stating that it was factually incorrect to claim that the Thai monarch had access to all of the CPB's assets. The Royal Assets Structuring Act of 1936, 1941 and 1948 had "separated" the CPB's material wealth into one bucket for "personal assets", another for "crown property", and a third for "public property" (Montlake 2012a). It is not necessarily surprising that a Thai government official would defend the monarch's prestige, honour -or what a Thai might refer to as barami -as well as whom the CPB actually represents. 9 However, any historical review of how the monarch has personally engaged in business dealings to defend the wealth of the CPB since 1948 shows that, despite the Thai government's objection that the monarch does not control all of the CPB wealth all of the time, the "separation" between these supposed accounts within the CPB is elusive at best. Here, I provide two documented examples, out of many since 1948, of the Thai monarch's involvement in wealth defence. During the turbulent 1970s, with oil price hikes and the failure of the CPB's multimillion dollar investment in Air Siam failed:
[…] these problems must have demanded far more of the king's attention than he had to spare. When the crown's investments began to fail, he was put into the position of either writing them off or protecting them. This put him into conflict with workers as employees, with the bureaucracy, with foreign partners and governments, with competing businesses, with the military's vested interests, and with the government itself. It was a deep antinomian conflict for the throne. [The monarch] wanted to foster development while the students branded him the "big feudalist" (sakdina yai). The sheer frustration had to be an essential ingredient in his descent into reactionary panic (Handley 2006: 247, emphasis added) . 9 The recent case of the monarch's son's jet being impounded in Germany due to unpaid debts to a German national, and the Thai government's claim that the vehicle belonged to the state and not the son, is another example of how this issue of the monarch's wealth is purposefully muddled depending on circumstance (Buchsteiner 2011). Or from a decade earlier:
During the trip, the king also met with Henry Kearns, the businessman who had hosted the royal family in Los Angeles in 1960. Kearns was planning several substantial investments in Thailand, particularly a pulp and paper plant, but was hampered by bureaucratic issues. The subsequent joint venture between the Crown Property Bureau and the paper plant indicates that [the monarch] personally intervened after his return to make it happen (Handley 2006: 192) .
Although we should take the Thai government's claim that the monarch is unable to manage all of the CPB's activities all of the time seriously, these two examples illustrate that not only has the monarch acted personally to increase his wealth but, more importantly for this analysis, the Thai monarch has acted to protect his wealth in the same way as any rational oligarch would.
In the Forbes article on the CPB's wealth, Kevin Hewison noted that the extreme wealth of the Thai monarch is "ironic" given that the king has promoted his idea of the 'sufficiency economy,' emphasizing small-scale, traditional farming and Buddhist notions of moderation at the very time that the bureau's companies are expanding industrial production, encouraging consumption through investment in glitzy shopping malls and making large profits (Hewison quoted in Cunningham 2008) .
From the perspective of oligarchic analysis, it is expected that a monarch worth more than USD 40 billion should act like an oligarch. This is not to deny the ideological power or power from official position of the monarch, but simply to point out that these are additions to an oligarchic power of material wealth that is many times greater than even the richest of Thailand's tycoons. One need only to consider what would happen if the Thai monarch did not have over USD 40 billion to play with. If the Thai monarch had the same amount as the Queen of England -USD 500 million - (Kroll 2011) , would his influence extend out through his "network" in quite the same way to affect politics? In light of the recent coup and from the normative perspective of democratisation, one could also ask whether the monarch's oligarchic side has inhibited the consolidation of liberal democracy in Thailand at all. In discussing how the British monarchy has meddled in UK politics, Christopher Hitchens warned against focusing only on the wealth of the monarch: Some critics of the monarchy, perhaps seeking to give a demotic and levelling flavour to their outlandish and usually ignored reser-vations, have foolishly stressed the large private holdings in land, property and specie which are enjoyed by the Crown and added to by the Civil List. This is to miss the point (Hitchens 1990: 5-6 ).
Comparatively, the above quotation is very useful, because Hitchens notes that not all of the world's monarchs are best analysed through materialist lenses. In the UK, other factors are more important when discussing monarchy. By utilising the same calculations in Table 2 and 3 for the UK, the British monarch has an MPI that is "only" 2,677 times greater than the average net worth of a British subject (USD 186, 786) , in a society where it is estimated that one in every 10 British subjects has more than USD 1 million in assets (Robinson 2013; Shorrocks, Davies, and Lluberas 2013) . The Thai monarch, on the other hand, has an MPI that is 7,359,540 times greater than the average Thai subject. To have USD 500 million like the British monarch does is to be rich, but it does not make one an oligarch. To have over USD 40 billion like the Thai monarch does not only makes that person rich, but would also make him or her an oligarch in any society in the world. The question, then, is not whether the Thai king is a monarch or an oligarch, but rather simply an acknowledgement that from the perspective of wealth defence, there may be no safer role for an oligarch to play than the monarch. There is no greater tax shield for an oligarch than to be considered a monarch. How this particular oligarch utilises his untaxed income and net worth "depends totally on the royal inclination" (Porphant 2008: 171) . In materialist terms, there are oligarchs in Thailand and the Thai monarch is at the top of them all.
Battling Thai Oligarchs
Political analysts laughed through their teeth when Thaksin said during his first term as prime minister, "I'm happy with my financial status now. There's no need for me to seek more profits". Despite officially declaring USD 343.7 million in assets in 2001 as part of new election laws, years earlier in the middle 1990s the estimate had been upwards of USD 2.8 billion (Pasuk and Baker 2004: 29, 216, 252) . There may have been more truth in that statement than originally thought. Because money has always been important in Thai politics, both at the national and the local level (McVey 2000) , the real new element about the oligarch Thaksin was that he was willing to use his previous extreme material power in wealth alongside his new government position to secure and protect his wealth, as opposed to the more traditional get-government-position-first-thenget-rich formula of past Thai politicians. For an oligarchic analysis of Thailand, where extreme wealth came from is less important than how it is used as a power resource once acquired. Something like a paradigm shift has occurred in Thai national politics since the 1997 Financial Crisis. From an oligarchic perspective, this "Thaksinization" is more like a kind of "oligarchization", which is simply named after the one oligarch who happened to usher this variant of "money politics" into Thailand. However, as the years since Thaksin's premiership have shown, he has not been the only oligarch on the Thai national stage who has been willing to use the power resource of material wealth to effect political change. On this point, it is useful to briefly re-evaluate the 2006 and 2014 coups.
In the first phase, a year before the 19 September 2006 coup, Thaksin's government took steps to take an increasingly critical news programme of another oligarch off public television. This other oligarch was Sondhi Limthongkul, who had also been a media tycoon worth hundreds of millions of dollars in the first half of the 1990s and a former business associate of Thaksin. Though this was not the first time that Thaksin had used his media empire to do away with a public critic, this was the first time that the critic had access to material power nearly equal to that of Thaksin. All of the colourful street political carnival -the tawdry yellowshirt-versus-red-shirt divide -and the enormous cost of stage and sound equipment, of multi-coloured posters and flyers and silk-printed t-shirts, noise clappers, hats, scarves, whistles, flags, headbands, and what would otherwise be paraphernalia better suited for spectator sports, as well as the cost of providing food and shelter and in some cases funds for lost wages -was downstream. It was not from any of the now-forgotten critics of Thaksin's government who had been kicked off the air or asked to leave a newspaper, but from one oligarch who could afford to patronise a year-long protest. This is not to say that the oligarch Sondhi had not touched a raw nerve of Bangkokians who were genuinely growing unhappy with Thaksin. What this analysis asks us to consider is the counterfactual of what if Sondhi had not had access to millions of dollars? Would events have unfolded in quite the same way?
It is important to remember that Chamlong Srimuang, the leader of the 1992 street protests that drove out the last military government, joined what was now being called Sondhi's People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) in 2006, not the other way round. No one would contest Chamlong's power base of mobilisation, particularly his "Dharma Army", but we should remember that this mobilisation and ideological power were in addition to Sondhi's material power of wealth (Nelson 2008) . If anything, PAD, with this addition of mobilisation power was arguably spinning out of control. When it was announced that Thaksin was or-chestrating the sale of his entire stake in Shin Corporation to Temasek Holdings in Singapore, tax-free, for approximately USD 2 billion (acting much as we should expect any self-respecting oligarch would in his situation), Sondhi had additional fodder to draw some 50,000 people to Bangkok's Royal Plaza on his 4 February 2006 rally (Montesano 2009 ). Rallies for and against Thaksin's regime continued off and on until the coup in September; while their size varied, nearly all of them were funded by one of these two oligarchs. 10 This type of political carnival does not come free.
Again, in the lead-up to the 22 May 2014 coup, many of the street protests were financed by oligarchs, although this time the money has been more difficult to trace to specific individuals. Suthep Thaugsuban, who emerged as something of a public leader in these protests, did not have enough, by himself, to pay for all the protest equipment and security, despite being from a wealthy family. A Bangkok-based political think tank estimated that the 2013-2014 round of street protests averaged "around five million baht [about 153,000 USD] a day on sustaining the protesters" (Eimer 2013) . Later, Suthep would admit that he had received outside financing for the protests:
We have spent almost 1.4 billion baht on our movement over the past six months. Of the money, 400 million came from the families and allies of protest leaders. Another 1 billion baht was from cash donations from our supporters.
These protests were the largest to take place in Bangkok since the student protests of the 1970s. The escalating protests and growing security concerns were the publicly stated reason why General Prayuth Chanocha established full military control in May.
The top oligarch's role in recent public events is more difficult to assess. This is partly because of the passionate nature of the impending royal succession, partly because of the near impossibility of tracing royal funds, and partly because of the very real fear of lèse-majesté. For example, sale of the journalist Andrew MacGregor Marshall's (2014) recent publication of Thailand's "crisis" was banned in Thailand. Marshall's analysis does not stem from a purely materialist vantage point, but it does provide additional insight relevant here, particularly regarding how ideological sources of power overlap with oligarchic (and coercive) sources. Because the top oligarch is "worshipped by his people as a demigod" (The Economist 2008), 11 this amazingly turgid base of ideological power overshadows so much of recent events that the battling of Thai oligarchs can often seem to be over who is closest to this source of reverential ideology. Suthep asserted this ideological cover, calling for "The People's Committee for Absolute Democracy with the King as Head of State" -the marshalling of the top oligarch's name being key. 12 From an oligarchic perspective, the real question is how to maintain affectations toward this princely ideology whilst also managing the access to the top oligarch's Crown Property Bureau after his death. The object of the oligarchic game of "'kingmaker' -placing a monarch on the throne who would protect and reward them" (Marshall 2014: 110) -adds a unique dimension to how oligarchy in Thailand plays out, but does not in any way argue against the phenomenon of oligarchy itself. As to the monarch's personal role in this fight between and with other oligarchs, there is more conjecture than empirical evidence at this point. The top oligarch's most public move to these series of events has been to recognise the legality of the current military regime.
Keeping the above in mind, one could argue that neither one of the last two coups would have been possible without the pathological recklessness of these oligarchs (Thaksin, Sondhi, and Suthep's backers). Marshall argues that the oligarchs' "strategy was by now well established: they would use a campaign of street protests, parliamentary disobedience, and judicial sabotage to undermine the government [...]" (2014: 202) . Though it is not the point of this paper to make a causal argument, empirical evidence thus far seems to suggest a hypothesis worth investigating further for the 2006 and 2014 coups: oligarchic funding AE paid-in-part protests AE security concern AE military takeover In this sense, Giles Ji Ungpakorn (2007 Ungpakorn ( , 2010 was correct to stress the material interests behind the 2006 coup. However, to call it a "coup for the rich" is something of a misnomer and again shows the inherent weakness in trying to grapple with the very real empirics of extreme material inequality through Marxist class analysis. Were Thaksin, Sondhi, 11 Jackson (2009) uses the phrase "virtual deity." 12 The full Thai name is Khanakamakan prachachon phuea kanplienplaeng prathaetthai hai pen prachathipatai thi sombun an mi phramahakasat songben pramukh (³¦¦¤µ¦ ¦³µÁ¡º É°µ¦Á¨Ȩ ¥Â¨¦³Á«Å¥Ä®o ÁÈ ¦³µ· Å¥Ȩ ¤¼ ¦°¤¡¦³¤®µ¬¦· ¥r ¦ÁÈ ¦³¤» ). Note that the translation for English newspapers left out the part about the king: "The People's Democratic Reform Committee" (Marshall 2014: 203) . and Suthep's funders not part of "the rich"? The last two coups were not downstream from a crisis between classes, that of the few rich and the many poor, but between the rich themselves; specifically between different Thai oligarchs. Oligarchic analysis cannot be used to try and explain every event in Thailand in the way that structural post-Marxian accounts often do. Oligarchic analysis is more useful in a limited range. In the case of Thailand's wealthy fighting each other, modern oligarchic theory fits unnervingly well.
Conclusion
I have argued here that Thailand has an oligarchy. Winters' concept of oligarchy can be utilised to shed light on some aspects of Thai national politics. This does not mean that oligarchy explains everything, but rather that without the concept of oligarchy, aspects of extreme wealth's influence on Thai politics seem less clear. The fact that Thailand is currently under the control of a military regime does not dispel the empirical fact that the Thai oligarchy has survived. Thai oligarchs are those who rank high on a Material Power Index and although there is no strict cutoff, any individual found on a Forbes list easily fits the description of an oligarch. Included in this cohort is the Thai monarch. Some past descriptions of oligarchy have tended to analyse it via a Marxist perspective, while others have blurred the differences between an oligarch and an elite. The least productive way to use the term oligarchy is to think of it as a regime. When oligarchy is recognised as having a power that is based in material wealth, which is qualitatively different than the power resources of traditional elites, researchers have recourse to a materialist view of any state and society that elucidates factors that may have otherwise remained hidden from view. From an oligarchic analytical perspective, one of the more interesting political processes in the near future will be how the material wealth in the CPB will be transferred to the next generation after the Thai monarch dies. One can hope that most of this money and property will be dispersed throughout society. It would then be easier to test whether the new Thai monarch's power base derives from resources of position and ideology or wealth. However, if the CPB's wealth remains intact and is passed on to the next generation, and the new Thai monarch, due to reasons of personality, loses respect or is even hated by the Thai people, then researchers will be able to analyse the top oligarch's power in a new way. When sources of ideological power dry up, the implicit will become explicit, and naked material wealth may be showcased in a manner hitherto unknown in Thailand.
